An empirical issue is whether a mutual fund's change in intertemporal risk is intentional or arises from risk mean reversion. Our methodology uses actual fund trades to identify funds that actively change risk. Funds that are statistically identified as trading to change return variance or tracking error variance do not exhibit risk mean reversion. Mostly, funds trade to reduce risk and, in particular, tracking error variance. This is most evident for funds that previously attained a low tracking error variance. We find no evidence of a relation between past performance and intended changes to return variance or tracking error variance.
Introduction
A mutual fund manager's compensation is a function of the assets under management with investors providing more money to the better performing funds. In response, managers who are underperforming may attempt to increase returns by increasing the risk of their portfolio. Or, if tenure is a concern, they may instead reduce the risk to limit their losses. The risk of a mutual fund is a function of the variances and covariances of the stocks in the portfolio. Fund managers cannot change the variances or covariances of the individual stocks, but can change the risk of the fund by adding/deleting stocks or changing the proportion invested in each stock. The critical issue is how the changing proportions of the individual stocks affect the risk of the fund.
Several studies have examined whether mutual fund managers behave as though they are competing in a tournament, and whether their behavior is influenced by their interim relative performance. The results of this research are mixed. To investigate the relation between managerial risk taking and prior performance, changes to a fund's risk that managers intend 1 need to be distinguished from changes that occur through trades made for other reasons. Trades made for other reasons may cause mean reversion of risk. In the absence of a distinction between trades that result in risk mean reversion and trades intended to change risk, a spurious association 1 Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) also refer to "intended" risk taking; however, they use this terminology only to distinguish changes to risk caused by a fund's trades from risk changes caused by changes in the risk of the stocks in the fund's portfolio. With this usage, all trades would be classed as intended to change a fund's risk. However, we use the terminology to make the distinction between trades that were designed or intended to change a fund's risk and trades made for other reasons that change a fund's risk.
between risk changes and prior returns may be concluded. 2 Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) use total return variances in their examination of tournament behavior, while Chevalier and Ellison (1997) develop their model relative to tracking error variance.
3 There is continuing debate over which of these measures of risk is appropriate and whether these risks mean revert.
Previous studies do not make a distinction between intended and unintended changes to a fund's risk. A significant contribution of our paper is to address this shortcoming by identifying mutual funds that intentionally increase or decrease fund risk. We adapt the procedure in Cullen, Gasbarro, and Monroe (2010) by first determining the contribution that each stock in the portfolio makes to the overall risk.
Then we rank the individual stocks on the risk contribution from low to high risk and partition the stocks into 20 equal value buckets. We regress the net value of the trades in each bucket made during the period on the risk contribution for each bucket. Since the stocks have been ranked on risk, unless trades to change risk dominate, no relation will be found between the trades and the risk measure. This method allows us to test for statistical significance, on a fund-by-fund basis, whether the risk for each fundperiod has intentionally been changed. A significantly positive coefficient indicates a fund made trades to increase its risk, while a significantly negative coefficient indicates a fund made trades to reduce its risk.
We investigate the relation between fund risk taking and prior return on a moving quarterly basis. This is appropriate because investors wishing to switch funds 2 Schwarz (2009) cautions that previous studies that sorted on a fund's prior return may have simultaneously sorted on risk, and the finding that fund managers increase their risk following poor performance could be due to mean reversion of risk. Our results show that some funds deliberately decrease, while others deliberately increase, both tracking error variance and return variance. Unlike previous studies that have implicitly assumed equal numbers of risk-increasing and risk-reducing funds based on the median risk change, we find substantially more funds trade to reduce rather than to increase tracking error variance. This is particularly noticeable in funds with low initial tracking error variances. The propensity to reduce or increase both return variance and tracking error variance, however, varies over time. Funds trade stocks for various reasons that are not deliberately designed to alter the risk of their portfolios. Attributable to such trades, as a group, funds exhibit mean reversion of risk. However, those that we identify as trading to intentionally increase or decrease risk do not exhibit mean reversion. We also find no relation between prior returns and changes in return variance and tracking error risk changes.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the literature and develop our empirical predictions. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology, while Section 4 provides the empirical results. We conduct robustness tests in Section 5 and conclude the study in Section 6. Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) report empirical evidence that managers with poor relative performance in the first part of the year trade securities to increase the return of their portfolios during the latter part of the year. During this process, the variance of fund returns also increases. Their measure of risk change is the ratio of the fund's standard deviation of returns (return variance) over the last part of the year relative to the first part of the year. These authors argue that underperforming managers may trade securities that cause an increase in the risk of their fund.
Literature and empirical predictions
Hereafter, we refer to predictions of this outcome as the "tournament hypothesis." Taylor ( 2003) , however, argues that this tournament behavior may instead lead to the opposite outcome. He argues that it is rational for winning managers to anticipate that underperforming managers will increase their risk and do so themselves to maintain their ranking. If underperforming managers anticipate the reaction of the winners, they may instead decrease risk.
Considering both total and systematic risk, Koski and Pontiff (1999) find a negative relation between a fund's risk and prior performance. Furthermore, this relation is robust to a fund's use of derivatives. Busse (2001) and Goriaev, Nijman, and Werker (2005) attribute the Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Koski and Pontiff (1999) findings to biases in estimating return variance caused by the autocorrelation and cross-correlation of fund returns. Allowing for these biases, using either daily or monthly fund returns to compute fund return variances, they are unable to support the finding of tournament behavior.
The econometric difficulties associated with autocorrelation and crosscorrelation of fund returns are avoided by Chevalier and Ellison (1997) by calculating fund risk from the individual stocks they hold. To focus on managers' risk-taking behavior, they use the change in the standard deviation of the difference in fund returns and market returns over time. Referred to as "tracking error variance," this measure is calculated by weighting the covariances of the time series of excess returns of the individual stocks in the fund's portfolio. Chen and Pennacchi (2009) develop a model that shows tracking error variance is the more appropriate measure of risk. Empirically, they find that when a fund is performing poorly, fund managers tend to increase tracking error variance rather than focusing on total return variance. Fund managers performing poorly will maintain their poor position if they simply track the market in the subsequent period.
In an attempt to improve their position, they select securities without consideration of the market index. More recently, Elton, Gruber, Blake, Krasny, and Ozelge (2010) and Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) 
Data description and methodology

Data description
We obtain the periodic stockholdings of all US equity mutual funds for the 
Methodology
The change in a fund's risk is an ambiguous signal because risk can be changed intentionally or can occur due to mean reversion. However, if we examine the stocks that were traded, additional insights can be obtained. We present a method below that statistically identifies trades that are intended to change the risk of the fund.
Identification of trades that intentionally change return variance and tracking error variance
Virtually all trades conducted by a fund will alter the fund's return variance.
The traditional variance, as shown in Eq. (1), can be decomposed to reveal the contribution that each stock makes to the variance of a fund's portfolio.
where: n = number of stocks held during the period; x i = proportion by value that stock i comprises at the start of period t; Since our aim is to identify trading designed to deliberately increase/decrease return variance, we focus on Eq. (2). The RVCs are the elements of the vector T for each stock i held by fund j during period t. It follows from Eq. (1) that the i th element of vector T is:
We use the RVCs of the stocks held by a fund at the start of a period as the ranking variable prior to the assignment of these stocks to 20 equal value buckets. The RVC of each bucket will reflect the RVCs of the stocks it contains. 7 For any particular bucket j, the return variance contribution is given by:
where:
weekly data are generally used by practitioners or investment advisory services such as Value Line, Morningstar, and Merrill Lynch. 
where r j and r m are the monthly returns for fund j and the value-weighted market index, respectively. Analogous calculations are made to determine the vector of each stock's contribution to the variance of the tracking error of fund j during period t, where the i th element is given by:
where: r mt = monthly market returns over the previous 60 months.
This equation is similar to Eq. (2) number of regressions is used as the number of trials, the level of significance at which we find the RVCBetas (TEVCBetas) to be positive or negative as the probability of a success, while the critical number of successes corresponds to a cumulative binomial probability of 1%.
Trades intentionally changing return variance and tracking error varianceprior returns and risk mean reversion
Return variances and tracking error variances are converted into standard deviations, SD and TESD, respectively, to follow Chevalier and Ellison (1997) . These start-and end-of-period SDs and TESDs are used to calculate changes in the portfolios' standard deviation, SD, and tracking error standard deviation, TESD.
Funds with significant return variance contribution betas and tracking error variance contribution betas are classified as deliberately trading to change their risk.
For both risk measures, the funds are classified as increasing or decreasing risk according to the sign of the corresponding beta. These binary outcomes are logistically regressed on the return performance of the mutual funds over the preceding 9-, 6-, and 3-month intervals. If prior returns are motivating their risk-changing behavior, then a relation between preceding months' returns and the sign of the RVCBeta and the TEVCBeta should be evident. Furthermore, the tournament hypothesis predicts the relation to be negative, with funds that are underperforming (outperforming) their competitors increasing (decreasing) the risk of their funds.
Logistic regressions are used to estimate Eq. (7) and Eq. (8), where, respectively, RVCBeta and TEVCBeta take on values of +1 (−1) if the coefficient is significantly positive (negative). Equations (7) and (8) The market index return is used as a control variable and is expected to be positively related to the risk measures. When the market is increasing (decreasing), investors are more willing to assume more (less) risk. Portfolio turnover is included because managers engaging in tournament behavior may be more likely to actively trade and because return may be a function of trading volume. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) caution that larger funds may tend to engage in less risk adjustment than smaller funds; therefore, size (corrected for growth over time) is also included as a control variable.
Robustness test: Mean reversion of return variance and tracking error variance
Equations (7) and (8) consider only funds that intentionally trade to change risk. Now we consider the entire sample of mutual fund trades. If a fund's trades cause the return variance and tracking error variance to be mean reverting, then the change in return standard deviation (∆SD t ) and tracking error standard deviation (∆TESD t )
should be negatively related to the start-of-period return standard deviation and tracking error standard deviation, respectively. We examine this relation by estimating Eq. (9) and Eq. (10), which are described in the following section.
Robustness test: Prior performance and changes to return variance and tracking error variance
We investigate how return variance and tracking error variance are related to the return performance of a mutual fund over the preceding 9-, 6-, and 3-month intervals.
The tournament hypothesis predicts a negative relation between prior period returns and changes to fund risk as measured by SD and TESD. Consistent with Chevalier and Ellison (1997) , it is expected that funds underperforming (outperforming) their competitors will increase (decrease) the risk of their funds.
To achieve this, we estimate Eq. (9) 
Additional robustness tests
Five additional tests shed light on the robustness of the results. We examine the impact of multicollinearity in the logistic regression; whether the results change if continuous dependent variables replace the respective logistic risk measures; whether the results are sensitive to quarterly or semiannual mutual fund reporting; the effect of excluding index funds and using 36 months of returns to calculate variances. [Insert Table 1] 
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics
Identification of trades that intentionally change return variance and tracking error variance
To determine if there is a relation between the proportion of stocks traded during a period and the stock's return variance contribution, 49,673 univariate linear regressions are performed. Each regression is for one fund-period, and fund-periods with return variance contribution betas (RVCBeta) significant at the 10% level (twotailed) are identified. A repeat set of regressions using tracking error variance contribution are performed to determine the tracking error variance contribution betas (TEVCBeta). Table 2 reports the pooled count of significant regression coefficients (betas) over the 16-year period. A negative beta indicates trading that reduces the return variance or tracking error variance of a fund's portfolio. Funds exhibiting significant negative betas are preferentially purchasing stocks with low return variance contributions (tracking error variance contributions) or selling stocks with high return variance contributions (tracking error variance contributions), or both.
[Insert Table 2] The binomial distribution is used to determine whether the frequency of the significant RVCBetas (TEVCBetas) differs from that expected by random occurrence.
Panel A of Table 2 shows that both negative and positive significant return variance betas exceed the corresponding 1% cumulative binomial critical values. At 14.3%, almost twice as many funds trade to decrease the fund's return variance 9 compared to the 7.9% that trade to increase the fund's return variance. This indicates that trading to alter a fund's total risk is less common than is implicitly assumed in other studies, such as that of Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) , who classify 50% of funds as risk increasing and 50% as risk decreasing.
Moreover, in Panel A of Table 2 , of the 49,673 TEVCBeta regression coefficients, 23.5% are significantly negative, which also exceeds the 1% cumulative binomial critical value. Correspondingly, 4.4% of the coefficients are significantly positive and statistically below the number that would be expected by chance.
Therefore, the implicit assumption in previous studies that funds "game" tracking error by increasing or decreasing tracking error variance with similar propensity is not supported empirically. Moreover, funds are more concerned with reducing tracking error variance, while those trading to increase tracking error variance are relatively rare. Indeed, as shown in Panel B, funds in the lowest tracking error variance pentile are 7.5 times as likely to decrease as to increase tracking error variance. This is consistent with funds whose aim it is to reduce tracking error variance achieving this goal over time.
The annual breakdown of RVCBeta and TEVCBeta is shown in Panel C of 
Trades that intentionally change return variance and tracking error variancemean reversion and prior returns
The regressions, discussed earlier, statistically identify those funds that deliberately trade to change the risk of the fund. The results of the binary logistic regression of RVCBeta on prior returns, start-of-period return standard deviation, and control variables defined by Eq. (7) are provided in Table 3 . Model 1 includes 10,786
fund-periods with significantly negative or positive RVCBetas. The sample is reduced to 5444 fund-periods when matching prior returns are required for Model 2.
[Insert Table 3] The coefficient on the SD jt-1 variable is insignificant in all models. If managers of funds with high (low) return variance intend to reduce (increase) the funds' return variance, this relation will be negative, and conversely, will be positive if managers of high (low) return variance funds seek to increase (decrease) return variance. While our method focuses on intended trades, we note the possibility that random trades might produce a significantly negative relation through mean reversion. However, this possibility is not supported by the absence of a significant negative relation in our results. The coefficients for prior returns are insignificant for 9, 6, and 3 months and do not support the tournament hypothesis in which underperforming fund managers increase risk. [Insert Table 4] Cognizant of the result in Panel B of Table 2 , the positive coefficient on TESD jt-1 in Table 4 provides further support for the conclusion that funds with low tracking error variances are deliberately seeking to reduce tracking error variance further. This is consistent with the expectation that funds that exhibit trading aimed at reducing tracking error variance would, over time, tend to have lower tracking error variances. Notably, no evidence of tournament behavior is found in the relation between intentional changes to tracking error variance and prior return.
In Tables 3 and 4 , the RVCBeta and TEVCBeta are respectively significantly positively related to market return. This is consistent with our expectation that better performing markets increase the fund managers' appetite for risk. We also find that turnover is negatively related to both RVCBeta and TEVCBeta. Therefore, contrary to the concern that more actively managed funds have a greater tendency to increase risk, it appears they more commonly trade to reduce risk. Fund size is positively related to 10 Refer to Table 5 , model 1.
RVCBeta and TEVCBeta, suggesting that larger funds intentionally adjust risk more than smaller funds.
Dependence of changes to tracking error variance on changes to return variance
Of the 11,008 fund-periods with significant RVCBetas and 13,842 fundperiods with significant TEVCBetas reported in Table 2 , 6127 fund-periods exhibit both significant RVCBetas and TEVCBetas. 11 That is, with statistical confidence, these funds trade to simultaneously alter return variance and tracking error variance.
This finding indicates that some fund managers simultaneously alter both risks, although not necessarily in the same direction. Table 5 reports the regression results for Eq. (9), where the change in return standard deviation is the dependent variable. The highly significant negative coefficient on the start-of-period return standard deviation in all models provides strong evidence that return variance is mean reverting. Model 1 is estimated using 48,449 fund-periods. 12 As before, in order to incorporate the tournament hypothesis, prior returns are needed, and Model 2 uses the subsample of 24,727 fund-periods for which we can match 9-month prior returns.
Robustness tests
Return variance and tracking error variance-mean reversion and prior returns
11 The number of fund-periods differs from Tables 3 and 4 because we do not lose observations through matching control variables. 12 We lose observations because we match the control variables. Furthermore, the number of observations in Models 2-5 varies slightly, depending on the number of matching return months available.
The significantly positive signs on prior returns do not support the tournament hypothesis that fund managers increase the risk of their portfolios following relatively poor performance. Rather, our results more closely resemble those of Elton, Gruber, Blake, Krasny, and Ozelge (2010) . The addition of fund performance over the previous 9, 6, and 3 months in Models 3, 4, and 5, respectively, contributes little to the explanatory power of the model as indicated by the adjusted r-square. As expected, the market return control variable is significantly positively related to the change in return standard deviation. Contrary to our earlier result that focused on intentional risk changes, fund size is negatively related to risk. Turnover appears to be weakly positively related to risk.
[Insert Table 5 ] Table 6 reports the regression results for Eq. (10), where the change in the tracking error standard deviation is the dependent variable. Model 1 uses 48,441 fundperiods, but the sample is reduced to 24,725 fund-periods for Model 2. A highly significant negative coefficient associated with the start-of-period tracking error standard deviation indicates that the change in tracking error standard deviation is strongly mean reverting. As above, the addition of prior return performance in Models 3, 4, and 5 contributes little to the explanatory power of the model. 13 The size and significance of the coefficients on the control variables of market return, fund turnover, and size are similar to the results shown in Table 5 .
[Insert Table 6] 13 The standardized coefficients (not shown) on start-of-period tracking error standard deviation indicate that it contributes to 23% of the explained change in the tracking error standard deviation compared with less than 6% for prior returns.
It is possible that the analyses we present in Tables 3 and 4 are based on funds that experience large changes to return and tracking error variance as a consequence of using fund-periods with statistically significant RVCBetas and TEVCBetas. Funds with large changes to return and tracking error variance may produce results that differ from those we report in Tables 5 and 6 . Accordingly, we repeat these analyses firstly using only the top and bottom pentiles and secondly using only the top and bottom deciles of the dependent variables in Eq. (9) and Eq. (10), and obtain similar results. In summary, irrespective of whether return variance or tracking error variance is used, the results support risk mean reversion but are not consistent with the tournament hypothesis.
Multicollinearity in logistic regression
The SD jt-1 and TESD jt-1 terms in Eq. (8) are highly correlated. 14 This may lead to erroneous conclusions regarding the statistical significance of the independent variables and incorrect estimates of the coefficients in the logistic regression reported in Table 4 . Our large sample size reduces this potential, but nonetheless, we repeat this regression twice, omitting each term in turn. The coefficient on TESD jt-1 increases, with increased statistical significance when the SD jt-1 term is omitted. When the TESD jt-1 term is omitted, the coefficient on SD jt-1 also increases in size and statistical significance, in effect taking the place of TESD jt-1 . Accordingly, we are satisfied that our qualitative interpretation remains valid.
14 As indicated in Table 1 , SD and TESD have a correlation of 0.780, which is significant at 1%.
Intentional return variance and tracking error variance changes using continuous dependent variables
By using a logistic regression model to test the relation between statistically significant RVCbetas, TEVCbetas, and the explanatory variables, we reduce our sample size. Since this procedure may reduce the power of our analysis, we perform additional analyses using a two-stage process. First, we repeat our suite of regressions using Eq. (4), to obtain the statistical confidences that the RVCbeta (TEVCbeta) are different from zero and code these as either positive or negative according to the sign of the coefficient. We interpret these as probabilities that a fund's trades were conducted to intentionally increase (positive) or decrease (negative) the return (tracking error) variance. Second, we use these values as regressands to reestimate Eq.
(7) and Eq. (8). In effect, we have derived continuous dependent variables and use our entire sample.
These supplementary regressions produce qualitatively similar results to the logistic regressions we report in Tables (3) and (4). They confirm that we have not biased our analyses by focusing only on trades statistically identified as intended to change fund risk.
Impact of pooling different trading periods
In our analyses, we pooled the trades of funds that report their holdings quarterly and semiannually. The trades of funds that report quarterly are sampled more frequently than those reported semiannually; however, the latter are more likely to have larger changes in their holdings. This heterogeneity may bias the results.
Accordingly, we repeat our analyses using homogenized subsamples of quarterly and semiannual trading periods. The results for each subsample are qualitatively similar to those from our pooled sample.
Excluding index funds and using 36 months of returns to calculate variances
By excluding index funds from our analyses we can focus on funds that are actively managed and may be more likely to exhibit tournament behavior. This constraint reduces our sample from 49,673 to 47,504 fund-periods, but qualitatively the results remain the same. Accordingly, we conclude that the small number of index funds in our sample plays a negligible role in the results.
It is possible that fund managers place more emphasis on recent data and pay more attention to variances and covariances calculated over a shorter period. Similar to Elton, Gruber, Blake, Krasny, and Ozelge (2010) Accordingly, when we repeat our analyses using these variances and covariances, we generate results qualitatively equivalent to those in Tables (2) to (6).
Conclusions
15 Seventy percent of the fund-periods we statistically identify as trading to either increase or decrease tracking error variance when we calculate variance contribution using 36 months are similarly classified using 60 months. For return variance, the corresponding proportion is 68%. However, many fund-periods classed as trading to increase or decrease risk on one calculation miss the statistical cut of 90% confidence on the other. If the statistical confidence requirement is reduced from 90% to 80%
(two-tailed), then these proportions increase to 84% for both risk measures.
Trading by a fund alters the composition of the assets in its portfolio and changes its return variance and tracking error variance. Managers may deliberately attempt to reduce the risk of their fund by actively purchasing low risk stocks or avoiding buying high risk stocks, or by using the opposite strategy to increase risk.
The methodology developed in this study allows the identification of fund managers trading to deliberately change the risk of the fund and distinguishes these risk changes from those attributed to mean reversion. Funds that we statistically identify as trading to change return variance or tracking error variance do not exhibit risk mean reversion.
When fund managers trade with the intention to alter risk, we find that the dominant behavior in funds with low tracking error variance is to further reduce risk.
Indeed, we find that, with statistical significance, 26.4% of the funds in the lowest pentile of start-of-period tracking error variance deliberately trade to decrease tracking error variance, while only 3.5% trade to increase this risk. Our finding does not preclude tournament behavior by fund managers, although the prevalence of funds that trade to reduce tracking error variance suggests it may be a secondary consideration among those that track the index.
Focusing on funds that deliberately trade to change their risk, we find no evidence of a relation between past performance and intended changes to return variance or tracking error variance. These results avoid the ambiguity of previous investigations of tournament behavior that do not distinguish deliberate from inadvertent risk changes. Overall, our method allows a more precise examination of tournament behavior without the confounding effect of risk mean reversion. where r jt and r mt are the monthly returns of stock j and the market, respectively, calculated over the previous 60 months. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. Results for tracking error variance contribution beta are generated using an analogous methodology, which differs in that the market return is subtracted from the stock returns prior to calculating the return covariances. These are performed on 49,673 fund-periods between January 1991 and June 2006. *** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively, using the cumulative binomial distribution.
L denotes occurrences less than what is expected by random. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Wald statistic is given in parentheses. *** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The t-statistic is given in parentheses.
